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THE VALIDITY OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION GRANTING
ADMISSION TO A PROFESSION
By JAExs W. SIMONTON*

T

HE West Virginia Legislature at various times has enacted
general legislation regulating the admission of persons to
different professions affected with a public interest by providing
the qualifications for admission and prescribing examinations to
be passed by applicants. The constitutional validity of such legislation was sustained by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Dent," which upheld the general law passed by the West
Virginia Legislature in 1882. prescribing requirements for admission to the medical profession. For more than a hundred years
there has been general legislation regulating the licensing of attorneys at law and in 1901 the existing general legislation on this
matter was passed.2 In addition to this rather early general legislation providing requirements for admission to the medical and
legal professions, there are now to be found in the West Virginia
Code general legislative provisions and requirements for the examination and licensing of veterinary physicians and surgeons,'
7
"
dentists,4 pharmacists,5 registered nurses and chiropodists.
In 1915, apparently for the first time, the West Virginia Legislature interfered with the application of the existing general laws
relating to admission to various professions by passing two joint
resolutiofis which authorized and directed the State Board of
Health to grant licenses to practice medicine to two person specifically named.8 The Legislature evidently considered the per*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
125 W. Va. 1 (1884); 129 U. S. 114 (1889).
2
ACTS or W. VA. 1901, c. 62; W. VA. CODE, c. 119, § 1.
3W. VA. CODE, c. 15D, §§

30-35.

4W. VA. CODE, c. 150, § 29a.
5W. VA. CODE, c. 150, § 29b.
6ACTS or W. VA. 1917, C. 32.

7
8

ACTS OF W. VA. 1917, c. 41.
House Joint Resolution No. 7, ACTS OF W. VA.

that it

appeared by affidavits that Anthony R.

1915,

p. 597, which recited

Brown of Duck, in

the County of

Braxton, had practiced medicine and surgery for more than ten years prior to
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sons named in these joint resolutions to be competent to practice
medicine and surgery and believed that the application of the
general legislation then in force would cause hardship to these
particular individuals. At the next regular session of the Legislature, meeting in 1917, one more joint resolution of similar import was passed, authorizing and directing the Public Health
Council to grant a license to practice medicine and surgery to
one other individual. 9 The same Legislature also passed a joint
resolution directing the Veterinary Examining Board to grant
a license to practice veterinary medicine and surgery to a person
named. 10 At the regular session of 1919 the West Virginia Legislature extended this type of legislation to admission to the legal
profession by passing two joint resolutions which in one instance "requested" and in the other instance "authorized and
required" the Supreme Court of Appeals to grant licenses to
practice law in all of the courts of the state to two persons named
in one of the joint resolutions and to another person named in
the other resolution. 1 At the same session another resolution
was passed directing the Public Health Council to grant a license
to practice medicine and surgery to a specific individual.12 The
1881 and had continued to do .o down to the present time without a license and
requested the State Board of Health to issue him a license to practice medicine
and surgery.
This recited
House Joint Resolution No. 11, ACTS OF W. VA. 1915, p. 597.
that S. J. Ross of Schultz, Pleasants County, has been engaged in the practice
of medicine since 1870 but by an oversight failed to secure a license under the
act of 1881 and Is prevented by a tecbnicality from obtaining a license and is
an ethical practitioner and a useful man in his community, that therefore the
State Board of Health be "authorized and requested" to issue ,to him a license to
practice medicine and surgery.
'Senate Joint Resolution No. 16, AcTs 'oF W. VA. 1917, p. 553, stating that
Dr. J. V. Johnson has, prior to 1915, practiced medicine in the state for more
than thirty years, and that the Public Health Council be "authorized, empowered
and directed" to register him and to issue to him a certificate, without examination, to practice medicine.
"OHouse Joint Resolution No. 14, ACTS or W. VA. 1917, p. 561 "authorizing,
empowering and directing" the Veterinary Examing 'oard to issue to Dr. Thaddeus C. Jones a certificate to practice veterinary medicine and surgery.
nHouse Joint Resolution No. 10, ACTS OF W. VA. 1919, p. 513 and House Joint
Resolution No. 6, ACTS OF W. VA. 1919, p. 512.
22Senate Joint Resolution No. .2, ACTS OF W. VA. 1919, p. 498 authorizing
and requesting the State Board of Health to issue to U. G. Morton a license to
The resolution states:
practice medicine and surgery.
"Whereas, U. G. Morton has been engaged in the practice of medicine for
twenty years, land is a useful man in the community in which he lives, in the
care and attention of sick or injured persons; and
"Whereas, the said U. G. Morton is a respectable, honorable and intelligent
citizen of said county of Clay, and
"Whereas, the said U. G. Morton is prevented by a technicality from obtaining
a license to practice his profession; and
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demand for the passage of still other joint resolutions of a similar
character was obviated by the passage of an act 13 purporting to
be general in its nature and granting relief to those individuals
who were seeldng admission to the medical profession by means
of joint resolutions then pending. The validity of this act will
be considered later in this article.
The validity of the specific joint resolutions enacted at the
1915, 1917 and 1919 sessions, directing the admission of specific
individuals to the medical or veterinary professions has never
come before the courts for consideration, but the validity of the
joint resolutions passed in 1919 either authorizing and reqTdring
or requesting the admission of specific individuals to the legal
profession did come before the Supreme Court of Appeals upon
motions made for the granting of licenses to practice law to the
individuals named. As soon as these motions were made before
the Court, leave was granted to the West Virginia Bar Association
to appear as protestant to the granting of the licenses requested
and the question vas argued orally before the court by counsel
for the West Virginia Bar Association and counsel for the applicants as well as upon briefs submitted.
The decision of the Court which denied the motions to grant
the licenses was based on several grounds.1" In the first place,
the court briefly held, in aflirmance of its previous decision in
the case of In Re Application to Practice Law," that the right to
practice law is not one of the citizen's inherent rights, but is a
privilege which may be granted to him within prescribed regulations under the exercise of the state's police power and that the
granting of the license is a judicial, and not a mere ministerial
act. A second reason given by the Court for denying the motions was that the Legislature may not by joint resolution give
the force and effect of law to a matter which is properly the subject of enactment.' 6 Additional reasons of the Court for its
decision may best be stated in the words of the Court itself:
"Whereas, the said U. G. Morton is an ethical practitioner, and is a useful
man In his community; therefore; be it
"Resolved, etc."
3
1 ACTS OF V. VA. 1919, c. 90, p. 319.
UIn re Adkins, 98 S. E. 888 (1919).
1567 W. Va. 213, 67 S. E. 598 (1910).
The decision In this case Is in accord
with the weight of authority. See collection of cases in 6 C. J. 571-2. See also
13 HARV. L. REV. 233.
5
' Boyers v. Crane, Auditor, I W. Vs. 176 (1865).
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"It is not contended that these joint resolutions have the
force or effect of a statute, or that they amount to more than
an ascertainment by the Legislature of the qualifications of
the applicants to practice law, and their recommendation to
the court for licenses. Even if the resolutions had the form
required by section 1, art. 6, of the Constitution, for an act
of the Legislature, it would nevertheless be unconstitutional
for three reasons: (1) It was not read on three separate
days in each House as required by section 29, art. 6, of the
Constitution; (2) it was not presented to the Governor for
his approval or disapproval as required by, section 14, art. 7,
of the Constitution; and (3) it contravenes section 39, art.
6, of the Constitution. After forbidding the passage of special
laws covering a large number of enumerated subjects, the
section last cited concludes with this general provision:
" 'And in no case shall a special act be passed, where a
general law would be proper, and can be made applicable
to the case, nor in any other case in which the courts have
jurisdiction, and are competent to give the relief asked
for.'
"There is now and for several years has been, a general
statute intended to cover every case of application for license
to practice law in this state. It is not necessary in this
opinion to enter upon a discussion of the question to what
extent the Legislature may, in the exercise of its police power,
regulate the granting of licenses to practice law. It is enough
to say that, whatever may be the extent of its power in this
respect, it must exercise it by general, and not by special,
law. . . . So far as we know, this is the first attempt on
the part of an applicant for license to evade or avoid those
requirements."
From the decision in the Adkins Case it is submitted that certain conclusions may definitely be reached respecting the validity
of special legislation either in the form of joint resolutions or
acts regularly passed which admit specific individuals or a special
class of individuals to the practice of a profession, the admission
to which is fully provided for by general acts already on the
statute books.
In the first place, the conclusion can certainly be reached that
neither joint resolutions nor acts regularly passed will avail to
procure the admission of specific individuals to the practice of
law. This is particularly true in view of the Court's holding
that the granting of a license to practice law is a judicial act and
not within legislative control.
In the second place, it follows from the decision in the Adkhzis
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Case that the Legislature cannot by means of joint resolutions
secure the admission of specific individuals to the medical profession or to any other profession, at least where there is general
legislation fully covering the subject. Except on the question of
judicial control of admission to the bar, the words of the court
in the Adkins Case apply with equal force to joint resolutions
authorizing the granting of licenses to practice medicine and surgery or veterinary medicine and surgery. The joint resolutions
passed at the sessions of 1915, 1917 and 1919, authorizing the
licensing by the Public Health Council (or State Board of Health)
without examination, of certain persons as physicians and surgeons, and the resolution passed in 1917 authorizing the licensing
by the Veterinary Examining Board of a person as a veterinary
physician and surgeon were clearly as much in violation of the
constitutional provisions named in the Adkins Case as were the
joint resolutions relating to admission to the bar. If the joint
resolutions relating to the practice of medicine and surgery and
veterinary medicine and surgery were, as we have suggested, unconstitutional and void, then it would seem to follow that the
Public Health Council and the Veterinary Examining Board had
no authority to grant such licenses except in compliance with the
general laws on the subject. Since the general laws provided that
all who might then be licensed must comply with certain qualifications and pass specific examinations, it must follow that if any
licenses to practice either profession were granted under those
void joint resolutions; then such acts of admission were of no
7
effect..
In this connection, it is interesting to note that because of
its inherent power relating to admission to the bar, a court, without legislation to support it, may license persons to become lawyers. The Public Health Council and the Veterinary Examining
Board, however, possess no inherent power to license persons to
practice medicine and surgery or veterinary medicine and surgery and therefore could do so only in pursuance of the provisions
of the general law.
In the third place, the court by dictum says that if an act had
been passed in due form which authorized the granting of licenses to specific individuals, it would be void as being special
7

1 1t is possible that any person practicing under such a void license

may be

subject to prosecution.
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legislation in violation of Section 39, Article 6 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"The Legislature shall not pass special or local laws in
any of the following enumerated cases:" (Here follow eighteen enumerated prohibitions).
"The Legislature shall provide by general laws, for the
foregoing and all other enumerated cases for which provision
can be so made; and in no case shall a special act be passed,
where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable to the case, nor in any other case in which the courts
have jurisdiction, and are competent to give the relief asked
for. "
The dictum of the Court to the effect that a special law in the
form of an act authorizing the granting of licenses to practice a
profession would be void under the Constitutional provision
named above if there were general laws relating to admission to
that profession raises what is more than a moot question in view
of the fact that at the 1919 session of the West Virginia Legislature an act was passed which seems to come within the dictum of
the court.1 ' The act in question reads as follows:
"That the public health council of this state is authorized
so to do and shall, during the period of one year from the
date this act becomes effective, upon the production of satisfactory evidence that the person applying is of good moral
character, is proficient in the science of medicine and surgery,
has had at least ten years previous experience in the practice
in the state of West Virginia and is otherwise qualified and
is a bona. fide resident of this state and after a practical examination grant and issue to such persons license or certificate
of authority to practice the profession of medicine and
surgery. "
This act became effective May 22, 1919. It is in form a general
law applying to a particular class of persons, but nevertheless,
had the same object and served the same purposes as the joint
resolutions which preceded it. It comes within the language of
Justice Paxton of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who says:"
"It is special legislation under the attempted disguise of a general
law. Of all forms of special legislation this is the most vicious."
It authorizes the granting of licenses to practice medicine and sur"BACTS OP W. VA. 1919, C. 90, p. 319 referred to in note 13, supra.
29Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 422, 425 (1880).
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gery to a class of persons, one essential qualification of which is
that each member of such class shall have practiced medicine in
this state for a period of at least ten years prior to his application for license under the act, without regard to the fact that,
except in the case of persons who practiced for ten years prior
to 1882, such practice was necessarily carried on in violation of
law. It is obvious that this act was not intended to have the
limited operation which would result if it applied only to those
necessarily old men who had practiced for ten years prior to 1882.
It is probably true that many of those who voted for this bill did
so without noticing that, as to most of the persons within the
class, violation of the law for ten years is a necessary qualification.
If the Legislature is restrained by Article 6, Section 39 of the
Constitution from passing a law admitting an individual to the
practice of medicine and surgery without meeting the qualifications
required in the general law of all other candidates, can it by this
apparent general law secure the admission of all who fall within
this class? Is not this a special law camouflaged as a general law?
The law is well settled that constitutional provisions forbidding
special legislation in specific cases do not make invalid a reasonable
and proper classification of the objects of legislation, and that a
legislature may classify and make different provisions apply to
different classes. In other words, legislation based on proper classification is not special legislation. 20 There are at least two fundamental considerations in determining the propriety of a classification. In the first place the legislature cannot adopt an arbitrary classification, for it must be based on some reason suggested
by such differences in the circumstances of the subjects placed in
the different classes as to disclose the necessity or propriety of different legislation in respect thereto. 2 It is also settled law that
the classification cannot be based on existing or past conditions
only, excluding persons or things thereafter coming into the same
situation or condition. 22 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
2OSee LEWzS' SUTHEnLAND,
many cases are cited.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,

2

ed.,

§§ 202-203,

where

21

State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150 (1893).
22Lougher v. Soto, 129 Cal. 610, 62 Pac. 184 (1900) ; Thomas v. Austin, 103
Ga. 701, 30 S. E. 627 (1898) ; Hetland v. County Commissioners, 89 Minn. 492,
95 N. W. 305 (1903); Murnane v. City of St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479, 27 S. W. 7l1
(1894) ; State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885) ; Edmonds V. Herbrandson,
2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970 (1891); State v. O'Connor, 54 N. J. L. 36, 22 AtM
1091 (1891) : State -v. Trenton, 55 N. J. L. 72, 25 Atl. 113 (1892) ; Burlington V.
Pennsylvania R. I. Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 259, 38 Atl. 849 (1897), affirmed 58 N.
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Appeals has stated the law as to the proper manner of classification in Groves v. County Court, 23 where it says:
"Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for
less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar
condition and circumstances; local laws are special as to
place ........
A general law is that which relates to a
whole class of persons, places, relations or things grouped according to some specified class characteristic, binding all
within the jurisdiction of the law making power, limited as
that power may be by its territorial operation or by constitutional restraint. And it is none the less general though at
the date of its passage there may be but one, or in fact not
one, individual of the class thus created, provided it be reasonable, and not illusory in its generalization; and provided
that the circle or ring of classification be such as to remain
open to receive the potentials which may arise bearing the
peculiar mark of the class."
To illustrate the latter part of the above rule, a classification of
cities or counties based on existing population or upon the population shown by a specified census is void, not because cities or
counties may not be classified at all, but because such classification
is based on past or existing facts, while if it is based on population
reached from time to time it is valid, for other cities or counties
may reach the required population and join the class. Is the act
under discussion void within this principle ? It provides that for
a period of one year all those who have practiced medicine ten
years or more in Wes Virginia must be licensed by the Public
Health Council on application and after a practical examination,
if they show certain other qualifications. The act became effective
May 22, 1919, and continues in force one year. It is therefore
plain that the classification is based on an existing set of conditions, and that "the circle or ring of classification" is not "such
as to remain open to receive the potentials which may arise bearing the peculiar mark of the class." One who had not practiced
in this state for at least nine years before the act became effective
could never become a member of the class. If the authority given
J. Eq.
(1894)
56 N.
0. St.

547, 43 At]. 700 (1899); State v. Newark, 57 N. J. L. 83, 30 Atl. .186
; State v. Post, 55 N. J. L. 264, 26 At. 683 (1893); State v. Trenton,,
J.,L. 469, 29 Atl. 183 (1894); County Commissioners v. Rosche Bros., 50
103, 33 N. E. 408 (1893) ; Siblerman v. Hays, 59"0. St. 582, 53 N. E.
258 (1899) ; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258 (1878); Scowden's Appeal,
96 Pa. St. 422 (1880); Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270 (1894).
-42 W. Va. 587, 26 S. E. 460 (1896)
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to the Public Health Council were not limited to one year then
other persons might become members of the class from time to
time and the act would not be open to this objection. But, as the
act stands, the maximum number of this class was fixed as definitely as if they had all been mentioned by name. There clearly
was no emergency which could bring this case within the doctrine to this effect announced in some cases. 24 It is a plain attempt
to grant special privileges and immunities to certain individuals
and is null and void unless the Legislature has power under Article
6, Section 39, to pass special legislation as to all matters not expressly included within the specific prohibitions of this section or
of some other part of the Constitution.
The act is also special or class legislation for the other reason
above-mentioned, namely, that it does not follow a reasonable
basis of classification and is therefore void unless the Constitution
does not prohibit such special legislation. While a legislature may
designate classes and fix different requirements as to each class,
such classification must not be arbitrary or intended to evade the
Constitution but must be based on differences which might reasonably call for different legislative action. Thus it is conceivable
that a city or county of large population may require regulations
different from those applicable to small cities or counties or that
different regulations may be ireasonably imposed on different
classes of business, or on different professions, but there must always be some such reasonable basis of classification. A purely arbitrary basis will not do. This principle has been stated by the
New Jersey court as follows :25
"But the true principle requires something more than the
mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to
classify; for the characteristics which thus serve as a basis
of classification must be of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring special legislation.
There must be a substantial distinction, having a reference
to the subject-matter of the proposed legislation, between the
objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects
or places excluded. The marks of distinction on which the
classification is founded, must be such, in the nature of things,
as will, in some reasonable dez:ree. at least, account for or
justify the restriction of the legislation."
2'See Alexander r. Duluth, 77 Y".-.1 45, 2 N. W. 623 (1899); State v. Guttenberg. 62 N. .1 L. 665, 43 At'. 7 .
-.
. J
J. L. 616, 44 Atl. 758 (1899).
-State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435 (180).
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The Legislature, if it had full power to classify as it
-pleased, could nullify all the prohibitions contained in Article 6,
Section 39 by passing laws general in form but special ini fact.
There would seem to be no sound reason for permitting those persons who have been practicing medicine and surgery in this state
without a license f6r a definite number of years, now to secure licenses under terms and conditions different from the terms and
conditions which apply to all other persons who may desire such
licenses. Certainly practicing a profession for ten years in violation of the law cannot be considered a reasonable basis tur classification. The passage of such an act is in itself a practical reason
why the Supreme Court. of Appeals ought to hold that under the
Constitutional provisions above-mentioned the Legislature's acts
are subject to review by the Court.
Provisions to the effect that no special or local law shall be
passed where a general law is proper and can be made applicable
are found in the constitutions of many of the states though such
provisions are usually not stated in such sweeping language as in
Article 6, Section 39 of the West Virginia Constitution. 20 Since
the language is not the same, these provisions of the West Virginia Constitution do not necessarily bear the same construction
as similar provisions in other constitutions.
The courts have always held that a special or local law which
violates a specific prohibition such as one of the eighteen given in
Article 6, Section 39, is void since such provisions are mandatory
and the question as to whether there has been a violation is for
the court.27 But a special act admitting persons to the practice of
medicine and surgery does not fall within any of the eighteen
enumerated prohibitions of Article 6, Section 39 and therefore
such an act is valid unless the court holds it void as violating the
general prohibition at the end of that section. A general law governing the admission of candidates to practice medicine has been
in force in this state for thirty-seven years and so it has been
plainly demonstrated that a general law can be made applicable.
mSee constitutions of: Arizona, Art. 4, § 19; Arkansas, Art. 5, § 25; Call"fornia, Art. 4, § 25; Colorado, Art. 5. § 25; Illinois. Art, 4, § 22; Indiana,, Art.
4, § 23; Iowa, Art. 3, § 30; Kentucky, §§ 59 & 60; Maryland, Art. 3, § 33;
'Mississippi, lArt. 4, § 87; Montana, Art. 5, § 26; Nevada, At. 4, § 21; New
Mexico, Art. 4, §§ 24 & 26: North Dakota, Art. 2, § 70; Oklahoma, Art. 5, §
59; South Carolina, Art. 3, § 34; South 'Dakota, Art. 3, § 23; Texas, Art. 3, §
*Z6; Utah, Art. 6, § 26; Wyoming, Art. 3. § 27.
"See Lswxs' SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORy rONSTRUcrON, 2 ed., § 190.
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This is a consideration which the West Virginia court recognized
as of importance in the Adkins Case where the Court calls attention to the fact that there has been for many years "a general
statute intended to cover every case of application for license to
practice law." How then can there be any doubt as to the soundness of the dictum of the court to the effect that had such a joint
resolution been passed regularly as a bill it would be unconstitutional and void?
The whole matter depends upon whether, under the general
constitutional provision quoted above, the question whether a general law is proper and can be made applicable is a matter solely
within the discretion of the legislature or is one which the court
has jurisdiction to decide. The fact that the language used seems
to indicate a command is by no means conclusiie that the legislature can be compelled to obey it, for many constitutional provisions, such as directions to the legislature to pass certain laws, are
in effect merely directory though in language they would seem to
be commands laid upon the legislature.25 There is no way to compel the legislature to pass such acts.
Who is to judge whether a special law or a general law is applicable to a particular case? Is it the court or is it the legislature? In the first instance the legislature must judge whether
a general law or a special law shall be passed. It must determine
which sort of law is properly applicable to the particular circumstances, provided the law is one which does not fall within any
specifically enumerated prohibition, for, if it were otherwise, the
legislature would be greatly hampered in its action. If the court
has a right to interfere at all, it is a somewhat limited right-a
right to decide whether the law passed, if special or local, is a
plain violation of the constitutional provision. To do this the court
must determine whether or not a general law is proper and can be
made applicable to the particular case.
The first clause of Article 6, Section 39, following the enumerated prohibitions reads: "The Legislature shall provide by general laws, for the foregoing [the eighteen enumerated cases] and
all other cases for which provision can be so made." This clause
in effect is not mandatory, for, as stated above, it is well settled
that the courts cannot compel the Legislature to enact laws even
2It Is sometimes said such provisions are mandatory but if the legislature fails
to act there is no remedy since there is no way in which a legislative body can
be compelled to pass an act. See 12 C. J. 741.
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where the constitution expressly provides that such laws shall be
enacted, nor is there any other authority which can compel the
Legislature to act. On the other hand, it seems plain that the last
clause, "nor in any other case where the courts have jurisdiction,
and are competent to give the relief asked for" is intended to be
mandatory and that the courts and not the legislature have the
right to determine whether or not they have jurisdiction and are
competent to give the proper relief. It follows that little aid can
be derived from the consideration of these prior and subsequent
clauses of the provision under discussion since the question as to
whether the latter has been violated is for the courts, while the
courts have no power in case of a violation of the former, and the
language in which we are chiefly interested is sandwiched between
the two.
The language which is pertinent is: " . . and in no case
shall29 a special act be passed, where a general law would be
proper, and can be made applicable to the case." As was previously stated, it is evident that the Legislature must decide in
each case whether a general or a special law should be passed and
the court cannot be concerned unless a case arises where the Legislature has passed a special law instead of a general law and the
validity of such special law is questioned. The Legislature must
necessarily be allowed a broad discretion in deciding whether a
general or a special act is proper in a particular case, and the
court ought not to venture to declare any such special law unconstitutional except in a case where it is clear and obvious that
a general law would be proper and can be made applicable. The
crucial question is: Was the Legislature intended to have absolute
discretion to determine whether a general or a special law will
begt accomplish the intended purpose or has the court power to
declare a law void on the ground that a general law would clearly
be proper and can be made applicable?
There seems to be no satisfactory rule or test by which to determine the question as to whether in a given case the courts have
power to nullify an act of the legislature in violation of a constitutional provision.2 0 As a general rule courts regard constitu20"Generally 'Ehall' when used in constitutions and statutes, leaves no Way open
for the substitution of discretion." Baer v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 50, 90 S. E. 530
(1916).
3"It is an established general rule that conDtitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory unless, by express provision or by necessary implication,
a different intention is manifest. Some cases even go as far as to bold that all
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tional provisions as presumptively mandatory3 ' and will declare
acts in violation thereof null and void. But sometimes the courts
hold that a legislature has sole discretion to decide a particular
question because they say the question is in its nature purely
legislative.
Why were provisions such as this inserted in so many of the
state constitutions.! They were intended to put an end to a form
of legislative abuse which caused the vast amount of legislative
corruption which existed somewhat generally fifty or sixty years
ago when it was said that a term in the legislature frequently
resulted in the legislator being able to retire with a comfortable
fortune.32 Many special and local laws were passed for the benefit of private corporations and individuals who frequently secured such passage by means of bribery. 33 Furthermore, local
laws applying to small portions of a state were so frequently
passed that the great number of such laws caused great confusion
But more accurately, the test as to
constitutional provisions are mandatory.
whether a -provision is mandatory or directory is the intention of those who
framed and adopted it.
This intention is to be gathered, not so much from a
technical construction of particular words, as from a consideration of the language
and purpose of the entire clause. There is a strong presumption in favor of its
being mandatory. But if it appears from the express terms of a provision, or by
it was intended to be directory
necessary implication from the language used, tbt
12 C. J. 740.
only, it will be so construed."
31
See Capito v. Topping. 65 W. Va. 587, 64 S. E. 845 (1909); Baer V. Gor,
79 W. Va. 50, 90 S. E. 930 (1916).
3-See People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill.421, 86 N. E. 672 (1908); Maize v. State, 4
Ind. 342 (1853); Thomas v. Clay County Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4 (1854). Judge
Schofield of Illinois, who introduced the section of the Constitution of that state
prohibiting special and local laws in certain cases, at the constitutional convention said: "The thousands of private charters that have been passed by former
Legislatures of the state were not demanded by the people as a body politic at
all. They were satisfied with general laws upon the subject. It was in most
instances individuals who demanded these special laws--individuals who were not
satisfied to do business upon a broad and honest basis upon which all might be
equal, but who wanted special favoritism, chances to plunder the public treasury
or their fellow men, covered up by a private charter to avoid detection or punishment. Those were the men who demanded these special laws, and at thir bidding
and by their behests they were passed. It was they who filled our lobby with the
instruments and appliances of corruption. It was the applicants for these special
favors that made legislation profitable, and enabled legislators, on a salary of
$2.00 per day, to at the end of a session display their wealth like successful
gamblers."
1 DEBATES OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 512.
83FEEUND,

STANDARDS

OF

AMERICAN

LEGISLATION,

152,

says:

"The numerous additional restraints which the nineteenth century brought
were all directed against the legislative power, for the executive had pracBeing, moreover,
tically ceased to be an independent source of authority.
the fruit of experience derived from the legislative history of the states, they
were no longer dictated by a fear of suppression of popular liberties. Political
danger now meant the danger of practical politics: waste, improvidence,
Popular right was no longer identified
fraud, local and special interests.
with individual right, but rather with common public interests."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1920

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1920], Art. 3
LEGISLATION ADMITTING TO A POFESSION

and it was frequently difficult to tell which statute applied to a
particular case. Consequently constitutional provisions were provided in many states which prohibited the legislature from passing
local and special laws in the classes of cases where the inconvenience had been most marked. These provisions have proved very
effective and beneficial3 4 and have doubtless aided materially by
removing many of the temptations to legislative corruption. It
is a fair inference that those who drafted such constitutional provisions intended to put an end to both these forms of abuse so far
as possible and to bring all matters so far as practicable under
general laws. With this end in view they inserted specific prohibitions as to those matters in which the abuse had been marked
and then inserted a blanket provision to cover all other cases which
subsequently might arise and could best be controlled by general
laws applying alike to the whole jurisdiction. In other words,
the intent probably was to limit the power of the legislature to
pass local and special laws by means of the blanket provision as
well as by the specific prohibitions. It is therefore doubtful
whether the general prohibition under consideration was intended
to be a mere cautionary restraint on the Legislature. Such restraints are too frequently of little or no effect. Doubtless there
is little or no legislative corruption at the present time but there
are nevertheless sound reasons why matters, so far as reasonably
possible, ought to be covered by general laws which apply alike
to all the state and why special privileges and immunities ought
not to be granted to individuals, associations or private corporations by legislative action.
In states where such a constitutional provision exists and the
constitution is silent as to whether its violation is a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the courts, the weight of authority is
to the effect that the question as to whether a special or a general
law is proper is solely within the discretion of the legislature and
that the courts have no power to declare a special or local act void
s"Unqualified praise, on the other hand, may be given to the practical abrogation of private and special legislation, and although the attempt to secure absolute
uniformity of local legislation has not proved equally successful (as the experience of Ohio and Illinois has shown), the benefit of these restrictions has greatly
outweighed their occasional inconvenience, caused In the main by the problem of
th metropolitan city, which imodern constitutions attempt to deal with by a
policy of constitutional home rule." FREUND, STANDARDS or AxRicAN LEGISLATiox 157.
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because it contravenes this provision. 35 Therefore the dictum of
the majority opinion in the principal case is contrary to the weight
of authority though it can reasonably be urged that the language
of the West Virginia Constitution is such as to make the case fairly
distinguishable from cases arising under the constitutions of many
of the other states.38 It is frequently asserted that the question
in its nature is purely legislative and not judicial, but as a matter
of fact there is no definite line of demarkation between questions
which are legislative and those which are judicial, so it is by no
means clear why this assertion is so confidently made. Certainly,
courts often decide questions whieh seem as purely legislative as
:rVan Hook v. McNeil Mounment Co., 107 Ark. 292, 155 S. W. 110 (1913)
St. Louis & Southwestern Railway Co. v. State, 97 Ark. 473, 134 S. W. 970 (1911)
People v. La Salle St. Trust & Savings Bank. 269 Ill. 518, 110 N. E. 3S (1913);
People v. Dunn, 255 Ill. 289, 99 N. E. 577 (1912) ; People v. lMcBride, 234 Ill.
146, 84 N. E. 865 (1908); Cleveland C., C., & St. L. By. Co. V. Blind, 182
Ind. 398, 105 N. D. 483 (1914) ; Marion School City v. Forrest, 168 Ind. 94
78 N. E. 187 (1906) ; Smith v. Indianapolis St. 1Ry. Co., 158 Ind. 425. 63 N.
B. 849 (1902) ; Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N. W. 347 (1903) ; Edmonds v.
Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970 (1891) ; Chickaska Cotton Oil Co. v.
Lamb, 28 Okla. 275, 114 Pac. 333 (1911) ; Viland v. Board of Education, 37 S.
D. 412, 159 N. W. 906 (1916); Smith v. Grayson Co., 18 Tex. Clv. App. 153, 44
S. W. 921 (1897).
There are many more decisions in Illinois, Indiana and Arkansas. Undoubtedly
the decisions from Illinois have had great influence in other states, particularly
in Indiana and Arkansas. In Johnson v. Joliet lBy. Co., 23 Ill. 124 (1859) the
court sustained a special law chartering a corporation though the Constitution of
1848 contained a provision requiring such :corporations to be chartered *under
general laws. The ground of the decision was that the legislature had always disregarded this constitutional provision and had (chartered a vast number of cor,
porations and it was safer and more just to all parties to sustain these charters
since they had been so long unquestioned.
When the question as to special laws
under Article 4, Section 22 of the Constitution of 1870 arose, the Court relied on
this old case. See People v. Harper, 91 I1. 357 (1878) and Owners of Lands v.
People, 113 Ill. 296 (1885).
In a number of states the framers of the constitutions were not content to leave
the question under consideration open but expressly provided that whether a
special or local act was in violation of the general prohibition should be a judicial
question.
See constitutions:
Alabama, Art. 4, § 105; Georgia, Art. 1, § 4;
Kansas, Art. 2, § 17; Michigan, Art. 5, § 30; Minnesota, Art. 4, § 33; Missouri,
Art. 4, § 55, Par. 32.
In Missouri the constitution was originally :silent as to whether the question
was judicial or legislative and the courts, following the majority view, held that
whether a special or local law should ibe passed was a matter solely within the
legislative discretion. The constitution was then amended so as to expressly provide that the question should be for the courts to decide. See St. Louis Commissioners v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247 (1876).
In three states the constitution expressly provides that the question shall be for
the legislative judgment. See constitutions: Now Jersey, Art. 4. § 7, Par. 11;
New York, Art. 3, § 18; Virginia, Art. 4. § 64. In all of these states, however,
a law such as that under consideration would be contrary to other express provisions
and therefore void.
55
Lack of time and space has prevented any attempt to distinguish the cases
cited in note 35, supra, on this ground.
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this one, and so if this question is purely legislative, it must be
because the courts have so treated it, rather than because it falls
within any definite test as to what is a legislative matter. A court
could take jurisdiction of such a question and it is not easy to see
why it should not do so if the legislature has plainly violated the
supreme law. Where a legislature does not pass legislation as directed by a constitutional provision the violation of the constitution is not subject to remedy for the courts cannot enforce specific
performance against the legislature but a c.ourt can very easily
declare an act void which plainly contravenes a constitutional provision. Some courts have adopted this view and have held special
or local acts unconstitutional where such acts plainly violated this
sort of constitutional provision 7 while other courts in sustaining
specific legislative acts have asserted that an act clearly violating
this constitutional provision would be void.3 5 Curiously enough,
if the rule laid down by this respectable minority were fairly applied to all the cases which have been decided under the majority
rule it probably would not change the result in a single case. In
the cases following the minority view the special or local acts in
question which were declared unconstitutional involved matters
which clearly ought to have been provided for by general law. In
nearly all the cases following the weight of authority the acts in
question involved matters where there was some doubt as to
whether a general law would be more appropriate, and hence not
a plain violation of the constitutional provision.
As stated above, in view of the reasons which gave rise to constitutional provisions like that under consideration, the probable
intent of those who drafted such provisions was to prevent the
='Krause v. Durbrow, 127 Cal. 681, 60 Pac. 438 (1900); City of Pasadena v.
Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604 (1891) ; Ex Parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550
(1880) ; Thomas v. Railway Co., 100 S. C. 478, 85 S. E. 50 (1915) ; Tisdale v.
Scarborough, 99 S. C. 377, 83 S. E. 594 (1914) ; Barfleld v. Stevens Mercantile
Co,, 85 S. C. 186, 67 S. E. 158 (1910) ; Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57
Pac. 170 (1899) ; Stratman v. oommonwealth, 137 Ky. 500, 125 S. W. 1094
In the Indiana
(1910) ; Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N. E. 3 (1908).
case above the court apparently forgot its former decisions to the effect that this
is a matter solely for the legislature.
win the following cases the courts state that they are not justified in declaring
an act void as violating this provision unless it appears that a general law would
be clearly applicable. As 'a matter of fact this is practically the rule a court
always applies in considering whether an act violates the constitution. Richman
v. Board of Supervisors, 77 Ia. 513, 42 N. W. 422 (1889) ; Evans v. Job, 8
Nev. 322 (1873) ; Quilici v. Strosnider, 115 Pac. 177 (Nev. 1911) ; Woodall V.
These cases at least contain
Darst, 71 W'. Va. 350, 360, 77 S. E. 264 (1912).
dicta in accord with the above cases and in a proper case these courts are free
to follow the rule laid down in the preceding cases and quite probably will do so.
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passage of special or local laws where general laws could plainlybe made applicable and would in effect be more just and equitable.
The usual rule applied by the courts in considering the constitutionality of a statute is that the statute in question will be sustained unless it is a clear violation of the constitution. 9 If this
general rule is applied to the question as to whether a special orlocal law is in violation of the constitutional provision under consideration it would mean that every special or local law would be
sustained unless it was clearly apparent that a general law would
be preferable, that is, unless it appeared that the legislature had
plainly abused its discretion. It would follow that the legislature
would have a broad discretion in the matter but would be restrained in the extreme cases in which restraint would be for the
good of the public. This would seem to come as near as possible
to carrying out the apparent intent expressed by the language of
the Constitution. As a practical matter it is difficult to see how
such a rule could possibly work any harm. As stated above, if
this rule were applied to the decided cases it probably would not
lead to a change in the decision of a single case, for the extreme
cases seem to have arisen in the states where the minority view
has been adopted.
There is a special reason why the minority rule would be preferable in West Virginia, a reason which does not apply in most
of the states where the law is settled in accord with the weight of
authority. The constitutions of all these states except Texas, Arkansas and North Dakota contain express prohibitions against
legislative grants of special privileges, immunities or franchises
to individuals, private corporations, or associations 40 while the
Constitution of West Virginia unfortunately contains no such
prohibition. In Arkansas the legislature is forbidden to suspend
the operation of any general law for the benefit of any particular
individual, corporation or association 4' while North Dakota has
a provision which has a like effect. -2 It follows that the legislatures of Arkansas and North Dakota, as well as of all the other
states which follow the majbrity rule, with the exception of Texas,
See also,
39See statement of rule and collection of cases in 12 C. J. 794 et seq.
article by Prof. Thayer, entitled, "American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," 7
HARv. L. REv. 129, 144.
10Constitutions: Illinois, Art 4, § 22; Indiana, Art. 1, § 23; Nebraska, Art
4, § 15; South Dakota, Art. 3, § 23; Oklahoma, Art. 5, § 51.
"1ARHANSAS CONSITUTON, Art. 5, § 25.
"NORTH DAiOTA CONSTITuTIoN, Art. 2, § 70.
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are expressly prohibited from doing the sort of thing the Legislature of West Virginia has been doing during the past three
sessions. Here is an excellent opportunity for legislative abuse
which is not prohibited by our Constitution unless it falls within
the provision requiring general laws in all cases where applicable,
but if the dictum under consideration is law then this possible
defect is effectively corrected.
Some cases indicate a tendency to hold that while the question
is solely for the legislature in the first instance, yet where a general
law is in existence and has worked well, then, since it has been
demonstrated that the general law is applicable, the question
ceases to be legislative and becomes judicial. One author states
this as the law but most of the cases cited as authority are not
in point.4 3 The principal case would fall within such a rule for
there have been general laws governing the admission of lawyers
and physicians to practice for many years, so that it has been
demonstrated beyond a doubt that this is the best way to control
the matter of admission to these professions. It is doubtful if
the rule suggested is sound on principle. How a question which
is purely legislative in the beginning becomes judicial merely because the legislature has once exercised its discretion is difficult
to see. If the legislature has the sole right to determine whether
a general or a special law shall be passed it certainly should have
the right to change its decision and decide the other way. The fact
a general law had been passed and has worked well would effectively demonstrate that this is a proper way in which to control
the situation but should not convert a purely legislative question
into a judicial one.
In conclusion it may be stated that there is no test by which
one can determine in the first instance whether this is a judicial
question or a legislative question. According to the weight of
authority it is purely a legislative question but if all these cases
are examined it will be found that they were not extreme cases
and had the general rule applied by the courts in deciding the
constitutionality of statutes been applied to these cases the resulting decision in practically every case would have been the
same. In extreme cases the courts have shown a decided tendency
to treat the question as a judicial one and there is a respectable
body of authority to this effect. There could be no harm in the
1

' See LEwIS' SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
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courts taking jurisdiction in such cases and such action would be
beneficial to the public by imposing a check on possible legislative
abuse. The rule stated in the dictum in the principal case would
be particularly valuable in West Virginia because the Legislature
would otherwise be free to grant special privileges and immunities to individuals or corporations except in so far as prohibited by other clauses in the Constitution, and the Legislature
has unfortunately shown some inclination to grant such special
privileges and immunities. There is certainly some ground for
apprehending that future legislatures may continue to exhibit
a like tendency if it appears that they have such power. The
courts by reason of their freedom from political influence and
pressure are safe guardians of the rights of the public. Therefore it is submitted that the courts ought to establish as law the
rule suggested in the dictum in the Adkrns Case.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1920

19

